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**SECURITY INFORMATION**  
**ANNEX D**

**PLAN FOR POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTION TO BE TAKEN**  
**IN PREPARATION FOR AND IN CONNECTION WITH A COMB INSTIGATED**  
**BY U.S., U.K., AND YUGOSLAVIA**

**I. DISCUSSION**

As pointed out by the SE Chief, (see Tab E, of Staff Study), while detachment of Albania from the Kremlin orbit by multilateral action is within the realm of possibility, an effort to do so under the circumstances now prevailing would be unwise. It would require diplomatic exposure of U.S. intentions and clandestine operations to an undesirable extent. It would require a much closer collaboration with the Tito regime than presently exists or in the foreseeable future would appear to be advisable. If successful, it would impose an economic burden upon the U.S., disturb the present power balance in the Balkans, reopen the question of Greek territorial claims on Northern Epirus, lead to additional frictions between Italy and Yugoslavia and invite unpredictable retaliations. If unsuccessful, its failure would produce a major psychological victory for the Kremlin and severely strain relationships among the Western allies.

The following plan for multilateral action relates some of the major undertakings that would be required in undertaking such action.

**II. MISSIONS**

Reduce Soviet strength by detaching Albania from the Soviet bloc through multilateral action with least possible risk of international war.

Establish the National Committee for Free Albania as the guiding spirit of the action with the Prizren League serving as no more than an executive arm in the employ of NCFAL.

Insure that Albania, when liberated, holds her first election under a multiple-party system and not with a Popular Front guided by Communism.

**III. ASSUMPTIONS**

1. U.S. and U.K. policy re Albania will continue to be coordinated.
2. U.S. and U.K. will take all appropriate overt measures to prevent liberated Albania from becoming a Yugoslav satellite.
3. All Essential Criteria listed in Tab G, of Staff Study, have been attained.

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**IV. OBJECTIVES**

1. Oust Hoxha and his chief lieutenants from government positions.
2. Install anti-Soviet, pro-West officials -- as many as possible from NCFA membership -- in all important government positions.
3. Induce the Albanian population to revolt actively against Hoxha officials and regulations and to endorse NCFA aims, policies and activities.
4. Induce members of the Army to renounce Communist command and join U.S.-U.K.-Yugoslavia forces.
5. Disrupt the effectiveness of the Communist security forces and induce members to defect to NCFA leaders.
6. Win the support of the tribal leaders to NCFA; induce the tribes to harass Hoxha officials in their areas.
7. Gain support of leading Moslems to NCFA.
8. Gain support of Catholic and Greek Orthodox population to NCFA.
9. At initiation of the coup, cause maximum possible disruption of local and national regulations imposed by Hoxha regime.

**V. TARGETS**

1. Hoxha government officials, including press and radio officials.
2. Albanian armed forces.
3. Security forces.
4. Tribal leaders and population.
5. Urban population.
6. Moslem leaders and population.
7. Catholic and Greek Orthodox population.
8. Adherents to pre-war political groups.
9. Professional and labor groups (Profsoyuz).

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VI. COURSES OF ACTION

1. Agree with interested foreign governments and/or security agencies thereof on the course of action to be taken and the specific policy and role each of the participating governments is to play in the action to liberate Albania from Soviet overlordship and domestic Communist regime. A consensus of opinion regarding the objective, scope, and timing of such action may be essential for collaboration with U.K. and France. Yugoslav and Greek and possibly Italian and Turkish authorities should be engaged for the participation in, and timing of, this action.
2. Since such a multilateral action, requiring revelation of plans and assignment of tasks to participants, entails greatly magnified security risks and multiplies the chances of "leakage" of information to the Soviets, the plan for concerted action will have to be carefully studied to restrict the knowledge of the plan and intentions to very limited top level contacts. In general, this action would presuppose an elaborate security program for the safety of its planning and timing.
3. Specifically, with relation to the U.K. the preliminary U.S. action should seek concurrence with its plan and support in related international negotiations. It would be essential to secure diplomatic support of Great Britain by extending the latter's recognition of provisional Albanian government when established.
4. Secure moral and diplomatic support of France and her recognition of the provisional Albanian Government as soon as established.
5. Strengthen and support the NCFA as a provisional de jure government of Albania with accredited representation to the countries recognizing it as such.
6. Publish a proclamation through NCFA to the effect that the Pristren League constitutes one of its armed units, subordinate to the provisional government of Albania; i.e., to itself.
7. Publish a proclamation through NCFA promising the Albanians a free, democratic election with participation of all political parties without any compulsion of adhering to any front or union of political parties approved and controlled by the Communists or any other autocratic force.
8. Secure Yugoslav and Greek support for operational assistance as required by mutually developed planning. In turn, supply the Yugoslavs and the Greeks with the necessary equipment for land, sea, and air support for a successful internal coup in Albania.

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9. Secure Italian and Turkish moral support of the Albanian anti-Communist coup.
10. Organize for action all military forces that may be mustered by NCFA and other Albanian emigre groups.
11. Obtain information on the strength and location of Communist Albanian army and security forces that may defect upon realizing that a coup is in process with good prospects of a successful overthrow of the Communists.
12. Produce leaflets and posters in the name of NCFA, using materials and workmanship which will not arouse suspicion of U.S. backing.
13. Deliver radio receivers into Albania by air drop and agent teams with special efforts to distribute them to the three major ethnic populations -- Ghegs, Tosks and Plainmen.
14. Broadcast liberation themes by NCFA and other radio facilities.
15. Coordinate with foreign intelligence services.
16. Prevent implementation of Bulgaria-Albania mutual assistance pact by broadcasting over the Bulgarian transmitter the theme that the uprising is an internal anti-Communist putsch and not aggression from abroad.
17. Mobilize agent teams for rumor spreading with special emphasis on tribal and Moslem populations.
18. Utilize agent teams in contact with Albanian Army to disrupt resistance by issue of false and forged orders. Solicit their support of the NCFA provisional government of the new and free Albania.
19. Instruct NCFA to attempt to gain control of the Tirane broadcasting station.
20. Utilize NCFA's small number of agents infiltrated in Albanian security forces to disrupt resistance to overthrowing Hoxha.
21. Organize food drops (attributed to NCFA) for distress areas.
22. When conditions within Albania warrant, support indigenous propaganda effort there by supplying hand presses, duplicating machines and necessary material.

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23. Use specialized jamming devices to effect ghost transmissions over Albanian radio transmitting beams if NCFA is not able to gain control of the facilities.

24. Maintain close coordination with RFE, supplying guidance on programs beamed to Albania and assisting RFE to obtain propaganda intelligence.

**VII. PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE**

1. Identify the coup as an internal uprising of Albanian people driven to desperate action by the tyranny and inhuman exploitation of the regime of Hoxha, the Kremlin stooge.

2. Name NCFA the de jure government and the official representative of the Albanian insurgents.

3. Justify U.S.-U.K.-Yugoslavia participation as coming at the request of the NCFA.

4. Publicize the Yugoslav, Greek and Italian renunciation of all claims to Albanian territory and their recognition of the NCFA government.

5. Publicize France and Turkey's moral support of the coup.

6. Stress that NCFA, Pristina League and BKI are close allies, but that NCFA has the leading role.

7. Detail tyrannous exploits of the Communist security forces; invite repentant members of the security forces to surrender to NCFA.

8. Exhort armed forces members to rally to U.S.-U.K.-Yugoslav forces.

9. Stress that Albania should be an independent country and a member of the UN.

10. Make frequent references to the deterioration of Albania's economic welfare under Soviet domination.

11. Counteract Soviet accusations against U.S.-U.K.-Yugoslavia by citing advantages of Free World nations over Soviet-dominated countries.

12. Counteract Soviet allegations that the Hoxha regime is the only one capable of preventing partition of Albania by guaranteeing that U.S.-U.K. will enforce Yugoslav, Greek and Italian renunciations of claims to Albanian territory.

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13. Propaganda should not actively encourage Titoism among the Albanian Communists, since the object is not to restore Albania to its former status as a Yugoslav satellite.

14. Stress that Albania's eventual form of government -- whether a republic or constitutional monarchy -- will be decided by constitutional assembly. NCFA is the temporary government. The problem of King Zog will be settled by the constitutional assembly.

15. Utilize the cultural hero Skenderbeg as a propaganda symbol for posters and flyers.

16. Cite facts to show that the Communist regime was responsible for:

- a. Debasing the Albanian economy.
- b. Making Albania the pawn of USSR power interests.
- c. Instituting terror against Albanians.
- d. Sending 20,000 Albanians to prison camps.
- e. Ruining the peasants through doctrinaire Communist policies.
- f. Converting Albania into a base for military operations against her neighbors.
- g. Making it necessary to ask U.S.-U.K.-Yugoslav help in ousting Soviet domination.

17. Characterize Soviet-Albanian collaborators as:

- a. Weak little men.
- b. Selling out their country's welfare.
- c. Enriching themselves.

18. Gain support for anti-Hoxha forces by:

- a. Citing the number of anti-Communists in Albania (one estimate is 85%).
- b. Citing the strength of powers supporting Albania against the USSR.
- c. Detailing the history of Albanian independence and Skenderbeg's contributions to Albania's history.
- d. Stressing the courage can overcome long odds and that "better an eye plucked out than a head lost."
- e. Exaggerating U.S.-U.K.-Yugoslav victories.
- f. Exhorting Albanian political factions to unite in ousting the Soviet stooges.

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19. Aggravate hatred of enemy by:

- a. Itemising atrocities of Soviet-dominated regime.
- b. Making martyrs of Albanians murdered by Hoxha forces.
- c. Emphasising the decline in the standard of living under Hoxha; the food and clothing shortages, the valueless paper money; the fact that the Communists have taken from the Albanian people all their gold and silver.

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